In an issue of first impression deciding whether a teacher at a sectarian school classifies as a "ministerial employee," the court held the district court erred in its legal conclusion classifying plaintiff as a ministerial employee and the "ministerial exception" did not bar her claims against defendant.
The case arose from plaintiff's employment relationship with defendant, which terminated plaintiff from her teaching following an illness. Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination and retaliation with the EEOC alleging defendant discriminated and retaliated against her in violation of her rights under the ADA. The parties did not dispute "religious institutions" include religiously affiliated schools and defendant met this requirement. Thus, the first requirement under the ministerial exception was present. The primary issue was whether plaintiff served as a ministerial employee. She spent approximately 6 hours and 15 minutes of her 7-hour day teaching secular subjects, using secular textbooks, without incorporating religion into the secular material. Thus, it was clear her primary function was teaching secular subjects, not "spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship." The fact she participated in and led some religious activities throughout the day did not make her primary function religious. Teachers were not required to be "called" or even Lutheran to conduct these religious activities. In addition, the fact defendant had a generally religious character - as do all religious schools by definition - and characterized its staff members as "fine Christian role models" did not transform plaintiff's primary responsibilities in the classroom into religious activities. The district court relied on the fact defendant gave plaintiff the title of commissioned minister and held her out to the world as a minister by bestowing this title on her. "However, the title of commissioned minister does not transform the primary duties of these called teachers from secular in nature to religious in nature." The "primary duties analysis" requires objective examination of "an employee's actual job function, not her title, in determining whether she is properly classified as a minister." Further, contrary to defendant's assertions, plaintiff's claim would not require the court to analyze any church doctrine.
In the end, this is, like we said in Texas, a case of putting lipstick on a pig. Or, a rose by any other name would smell as sweet. Courts are willing to look beyond titles in assessing the substantive position under these circumstances.
EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch.
