The Seventh Circuit overturned its precedent and held that a plaintiff in an ADA case alleging that she was discriminated against by an employer who regarded her as disabled had to demonstrate that the perceived disability was the but-for cause of the adverse employment action taken against her.
The court reasoned that the Supreme Court in Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., had essentially held that the importance that the court attached to the express incorporation of the mixed-motive framework into Title VII suggests that when another anti-discrimination statute lacks comparable language, a mixed-motive claim will not be viable under that statute. The upshot is that unless a statute provides otherwise, demonstrating but-for causation is part of the plaintiff’s burden in all suits under federal law.
While the ADA explicitly incorporates the remedies in Title VII available for disparate impact cases, it did not expressly incorporate the codification of mixed motives liability in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). Because the plaintiff did not demonstrate that the plaintiff's perceived disability was the but-for cause of her termination, the district court's decision that the defendant was liable for discrimination had to be reversed.
Stay tuned: we'll see how ADA amendments may alter this result in the future.
Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation Inc., No. 08-4010 (2010)
